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Abstract
The federal government controls 700 million acres of subsur-
face rights (plus fifty-six million subsurface acres of Indian miner-
al estate) across twenty-four states, making it the largest land-
owner in the nation, and thus putting it in a position to negotiate
lease terms and shape regulations of oil and gas development. The
rules of the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) on how
drilling activity can take place on federal lands essentially dictate
terms, making BLM the largest "regulator" of drilling activity in
the country. BLM last revised its oil and gas regulations (the On-
shore Orders) in the 1980s and early 1990s, well before the recent
rapid expansion of shale gas development. To date, there have
been two rounds of proposed revisions, the first issued in 2012 and
the most recent issued in May 2013, after BLM received 177,000
comments on the first round. This paper examines the 2013 pro-
posal in several key respects, including the scope and require-
ments of the new proposal, the substantial changes from the 2012
proposal, and a comparison of BLM's proposed rules with rules in
states with shale gas development and significant federal land-
holdings, based on earlier work. We find that BLM's proposal ad-
dresses some apparent gaps in state-level regulation and that,
generally, BLM rules do not appear to impose significant require-
ments beyond existing state regulations, at least across the regula-
tory elements we analyzed and in those states with large federal
landholdings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The combination of horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing,
and other technologies has led to a boom in development of oil and
gas resources from shale rock previously considered inaccessible,
dramatically increasing U.S. hydrocarbon production and opening
many areas to significant new drilling activity. This activity is not
without environmental, community, and other risks.
Traditionally, state governments have been viewed as the pri-
mary regulators of oil and gas development, with the federal gov-
ernment in a secondary role. But it is landowners, not the govern-
ment, that create the first and, in some cases, strongest limits on
developer activity through the restrictions they impose in lease
terms. This power is particularly strong for large, institutional
landowners. And it is strongest for the federal government, by far
the largest landholder in the country. The Federal Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) sets the lease terms for oil and gas develop-
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ment on 700 million subsurface acres of federal mineral estate.'
This is similar to (and is often called) a form of regulation but is
better characterized as stewardship of land held in the public
trust.
BLM also regulates fifty-six million subsurface acres of Indian
mineral estate, but the actual leasing is left to the tribes.2 BLM
has long regulated oil and gas development on federal and Indian
lands through its onshore oil and gas operating regulations (On-
shore Orders),3 most of which were last revised in the 1980s or ear-
ly 1990s. The recent expansion of shale gas development has led
BLM to propose revisions specifically aimed at hydraulic fractur-
ing activity to its rules. The agency issued a proposed set of rules
in May 20124 (the 2012 proposal) and recently issued a revised
proposed rule5 (the 2013 proposal) after receiving 177,000 com-
ments.
This paper examines the 2013 proposal in several key respects.
First, we consider the scope and requirements of the new proposal.
Then we identify substantial changes from the 2012 proposal. Fi-
nally, we compare BLM's proposed rules with those already in
place in states with shale gas development and significant federal
landholdings, based on earlier work analyzing state-level rules.6
II. BLM's ROLE IN SHALE DEVELOPMENT
ON FEDERAL LANDS
BLM is the administrator of federal and (to a debatable extent)
Indian lands, which are held in trust for the American people or
for Indian tribes. BLM has the authority to lease federally owned
1. BLM's authority to lease federal mineral estate arises from the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920 and the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands of 1947. Mineral Leasing Act of
1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2012); Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands of 1947, 30 U.S.C. §
351 et seq. (2012).
2. Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Congress charged
BLM with regulating oil and gas development and other activities on public lands for multi-
ple use and sustained yield. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§
1701-1782 (1976). BLM has interpreted "public lands" to include Indian lands, although
there is some debate as to whether that was Congress's intent.
3. Onshore Oil and Gas Orders/Notices to Lessees, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
http://blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/oil-andgas/onshore-oil-and-gas.html (last updated
June 5, 2012).
4. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal and
Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691 (May 11, 2012) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3160).
5. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636 (May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3160), available at http://blm.gov/
pgdataletc/medialiblblm/wo/CommunicationsDirectorate/public-affairs/hydraulicfracturing
.Par.91723.File.tmp/HydFracSupProposal.pdf.
6. Nathan Richardson, Madeline Gottlieb, Alan Krupnick & Hannah Wiseman, The
State of State Shale Gas Regulation, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, June 2013, available at
http://www.rff.org/rffldocuments/RFF-Rpt-StateofStateRegs-Report.pdf.
JOURNAL OF LAND USE
(non-Indian) mineral estate, which lies below more than 700 mil-
lion acres of federal, state, and private land, mostly in western
states.7 BLM has issued such leases since 1988 under the current
law, the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of
1987,8 and production from federal onshore wells currently ac-
counts for roughly eleven percent of the country's natural gas sup-
ply and five percent of its oil supply.9
Pursuant to BLM authority granted in its operating regula-
tions, 0 BLM has issued seven Onshore Orders that implement and
supplement the operating regulations. The Onshore Orders apply
to all oil and gas development on federal and Indian lands, and
thus operators developing shale gas on these lands must comply
with these rules. The seven Onshore Orders were created between
1983 and 1993 and only one has since been revised." In addition to
the Onshore Orders, which apply to all types of oil and gas devel-
opment, the operating regulations contain a short provision that is
specific to hydraulic fracturing and a few other activities. 12 That
rule was created in 1982 and has not been revised since 1988.
Since the mid-1970s, hydraulic fracturing (commonly referred
to as fracking)-a process where water, sand, and other chemicals
are injected into the wellbore at high pressure to create fractures
and stimulate production-has been commonly used on vertical
gas wells. However, it was not until the 2000s that combining hy-
draulic fracturing and horizontal drilling became widespread as a
technique to make the production of oil and gas from shale eco-
nomically feasible. 13 According to BLM, the expansion of shale gas
7. Note that the federal government may own (and BLM may therefore administer)
mineral rights under land (surface rights) not owned by the federal government. This is
termed a "split estate."
8. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 was amended by the Federal Onshore Oil and
Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987, which leaves BLM to administer leasing but gives the
Forest Service a more direct role in the leasing process for lands under its jurisdiction. The
amendment also established that all public land leasing must be open to competitive
leasing. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2012).
9. Oil and Gas, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., http://blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/oil
and-gas.html last updated June 20, 2014).
10. 43 C.F.R. § 3164.1 (2007).Onshore oil and gas operating regulations authorize
BLM's director to issue Onshore Oil and Gas Orders when necessary to implement and sup-
plement the operating regulations.
11. Onshore Order Number 1, Approval of Operations, which provides procedures for
submitting an Application for Permit to Drill and other required approvals, was updated in
2007. 43 C.F.R. § 3160 (2007).
12. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-2 (1988).
13. The percentage of total U.S. natural gas production accounted for by shale gas
grew from 1.6 percent in 2000 to 23.1 percent by 2010. Zhongmin Wang & Alan Krupnick,
U.S. Shale Gas Development: What Led to the Boom?, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, MAY
2013, available at http://rff.orgRFF/Documents/RFF-IB-13-04.pdf.
340 [Vol. 29:2
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
development has created a need to update existing rules embodied
in the Onshore Orders. 14
BLM's recent proposals can be characterized as a set of new
rules that will (when and if finalized) apply to fracking and some
related activity on those lands within the bureau's jurisdiction-
the first substantial revision of such rules since 1993 and the first
to apply specifically to fracking.
III. THE 2013 BLM PROPOSAL
The 2013 proposal includes a wide range of requirements
spanning the development process but focuses on frack fluid dis-
closure and testing requirements for casing and cementing. Other
sections of the 2013 proposal create new requirements for mapping
of fracture propagation and wastewater fluid storage. For several
other activities, the 2013 proposal defers to the Onshore Orders
issued by BLM more than 20 years ago.
A. Overview
* Frack fluid disclosure: Operators would be required
to submit chemical information on FracFocus, 15 directly
to BLM, or to another BLM-approved database after
fracking is completed. 16 Operators will be able to avoid
disclosure of compounds they claim are trade secrets in
an affidavit, without submitting any chemical infor-
mation to BLM.17
* Testing requirements for casing and cementing:
0 Cement evaluation logs: Operators would be required
to compile cement evaluation logs (CELs) and make
them available to BLM. 18 These logs record the re-
sults of tests used to detect areas where casing is not
14. See Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636.
15. FracFocus is an Internet database for industry's voluntary reporting of chemicals
used in hydraulic fracturing, as well as a tool for the public and others to use to query this
database. See FRACFOCUS CHEM. DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, http://www.fracfocus.org (last vis-
ited June 30, 2014).
16. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,636 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160.3-3(i)).
17. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,659 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3(j)(1)-(4)).
18. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,641 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3(d)(2)).
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bound to cement, which creates a risk of fluids inside
the wellbore migrating into water aquifers.
o Mechanical integrity testing: In addition to main-
taining CELs, operators would be required to run
mechanical integrity tests (MIT) on the vertical
sections of the casing prior to fracking or refracking
to ensure that the casing can withstand fracking
pressures, and continue to monitor pressures during
fracking. 19
* Fracture propagation monitoring: Operators would
be required to create maps plotting estimated fracture
propagation (how cracks in the rock would spread as a
result of fracking), along with fracture direction, length,
and height, to ensure that fracking does not threaten
aquifers or other resources. 20
* Wastewater fluid storage: Operators would be re-
quired to use (at a minimum) lined pits to store flow
back fluid and other wastewater, and BLM would re-
serve the authority to require operators to take other
protective measures.
B. Changes from the 2012 Proposal
The 2013 proposed rule is less stringent than the 2012 proposal
in two major regulatory areas: frack fluid disclosure and testing
well cementing and casing. This is in addition to the other major
change discussed above, narrowing the scope of the rule to apply
only to shale gas development where hydraulic fracturing is used.
1. Scope
In its 2012 proposal, BLM would have imposed new rules on all
"well stimulation" activities, including not only hydraulic fractur-
ing but also other activities that increase the permeability of res-
ervoir rock, such as acidizing, flooding, and tertiary recovery
19. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,676 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3 (f)-(g)).
20. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Land, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,648-49 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3(d)(4)(iv)).
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through steam injection.21 However, BLM narrowed the scope of its
2013 proposal such that it would apply only to "hydraulic fractur-
ing" and "refracturing."22
"According to BLM, the change was made in response to indus-
try comments that inclusion of well stimulation activities would
make the rule too onerous for what they consider routine mainte-
nance operations."23 However, some of these activities, such as
"acidizing" a well by pumping in large amounts of acid to dissolve
rock formations and stimulate production, are often used in con-
junction with fracking and may involve risk factors similar to
those associated with fracking. 24
2. Frack Fluid Disclosure
The 2013 proposal kept in place the 2012 proposal's require-
ment that fracking chemicals be disclosed after fracking has been
completed. 25 However, the 2013 proposal revises the nature of the
chemical disclosure requirements in three ways. These changes
generally reduce burdens on operators, at the cost of some trans-
parency.
First, the 2013 proposal eliminates a requirement that opera-
tors provide the estimated chemical composition of flowback fluids
before fracking operations begin, as part of the approval process. 26
BLM defended this revision on the grounds that the estimations
could be unreliable given that operators are permitted to change
the chemical composition of frack fluids after approval to begin op-
erations. 27
21. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal and
Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691, 27,695 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 3160-5).
22. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,647 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160.0-5).
23. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,645 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160.0-5).
24. See generally, LEONARD KALFAYAN, PRODUCTION ENHANCEMENT WITH ACID STIM-
ULATION (PennWell Books, 2nd ed. 2008); see also ARMSTRONG AGBAJI ET AL., REPORT ON
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND DESIGN OF MARCELLUS SHALE PLAY IN SUSQUEHANNA, PA
7 (2009), available at http://energy.wilkes.edulPDFFiles/Library/Sustainable%20Develop
ment%20ofo2OMarcellus%2Shale%20in%2OSusquehanna.pdf.
25. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,636 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 31,63-3(i)).
26. Compare Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Fed-
eral and Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691, 27,696 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be codified
at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3(c)(6)), with Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and In-
dian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,636, 31,649 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R.
pt. 3162.3-3(d)(5)).
27. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636-01, 31,649 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160).
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BLM also noted that requiring the estimations might result in
public discovery of chemical constituents of the fluids prior to op-
erationS28-Some of which might be protected trade secrets. Be-
cause the actual chemical composition of frack fluids is reported
after fracking takes place rather than as part of the approval pro-
cess, the 2012 proposal's requirement of advance estimates of
flowback fluid composition was the only data related to frack fluids
submitted as part of BLM's drilling approval process. Under the
2013 proposal, therefore, no predrilling information on frack fluids
is submitted to BLM.
Second, the 2013 proposal changed format and procedural re-
quirements for reporting frack fluids after fracking is completed. 29
Frack fluid disclosure to BLM is, under the 2013 proposal, explicit-
ly modeled after the fracking disclosure website, FracFocus. Alt-
hough reporting directly to BLM or another database specified by
BLM would still be permitted, FracFocus will presumably become
the preferred, if not the exclusive, choice of operators fulfilling
BLM regulations.
Use of FracFocus to comply with the new BLM regulations
raises some concerns. A recent Harvard study claims that "reliance
on the FracFocus registry as a regulatory compliance tool is mis-
placed or premature."30 The study finds that FracFocus encourages
inaccurate reporting, lacks a review process for submissions, and
leaves regulators unable to enforce reporting deadlines. 31 FracFo-
cus has undergone significant changes since this study was re-
leased, however, with version 2.0 of the website deployed on
June 1, 2013.32
These upgrades may have addressed some of the concerns
raised by the Harvard study. The FracFocus website notes that the
upgrades "will dramatically improve the site's functionality for
state regulatory agencies, industry, and public users."3 3 Specifical-
ly, users will be able to locate well site chemical information,
28. Id.
29. Compare Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Fed-
eral and Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691, 27,698 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be codified
at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3(g)(2), (4), (5)), with Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal
and Indian Lands 78 Fed. Reg. 31,636, 31,656 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3(i)(1)).
30. KATE KOSCHNICK ET AL., LEGAL FRACTURES IN CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE LAWS: WHY
THE VOLUNTARY CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGISTRY FRACFOCUS FAILS AS A REGULATORY
COMPLIANCE TOOL 1 (Harvard Envtl. Law Program, 2013), available at http://blogs.law.
harvard.edu/environmentallawprogram/files/2013/04/4-23-2013-LEGAL-FRACTURES.pdf.
31. Id.
32. FRACFOCUS CHEM. DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, http://fracfocus.org (last visited
June 30, 2014).
33. FracFocus 2.0 to Revolutionize Hydraulic Fracturing Chemical Reporting Nation-




chemical names, and Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) numbers
more efficiently. 34
Third and finally, the 2013 proposal also revises substantive
rules for fluid disclosure, eliminating the 2012 proposal's require-
ment that operators submit chemical information to BLM in order
to substantiate trade secret claims. 35 This was replaced by a provi-
sion that instructs operators to submit affidavits that the infor-
mation is subject to trade secret protection. 36 The affidavits, which
were modeled after those required by Colorado, must affirm the
following:
* that the chemical information is not public;
* that the chemical information is not required to be made
public;
* that the information is not easily discoverable through
reverse engineering; and
* that its release would likely diminish the competitive-
ness of the company.37
BLM would retain discretion to require submission of nondisclosed
chemical information for revieW38 and the provision suggests that
discretion would be exercised in the event of incomplete affida-
vits. 39 However, no information is provided as to how BLM will re-
view the affidavits or the specific criteria that will be used to eval-
uate trade secret exemptions.
Whether operators' claims regarding trade secret protection
(formalized in affidavits) are sufficiently reliable is not clear. Un-
der the 2013 proposal, BLM will clearly have less information
available to evaluate trade secret claims and, in practice, may not
be able to do so.
34. Id.
35. Compare Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Fed-
eral and Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691, 27,711 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be codified
at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3(h)-(i)), with Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and
Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,636, 31,677 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3(j)(1)-(4)).
36. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,677 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3(j)(1)).
37. Id.
38. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,659 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3()(2)).
39. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,659 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160).
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3. Testing Requirements for Casing and Cementing (CELs/CBLs)
A variety of tests are commonly used to detect areas where cas-
ing is not properly bound to cement. Such failures increase the risk
of frack fluids, flowback water, or other materials in the wellbore
migrating into water aquifers. The results of these tests are rec-
orded in instruments referred to as cement evaluation logs (CEL)
or cement bond logs (CBL). Both the 2012 and 2013 proposals re-
quire such tests and logs, but the 2013 proposal changed several
aspects of the testing requirements. Notably, the 2013 require-
ments regarding when and under what circumstances casing and
cementing must be tested would result in less agency overview of
well integrity, especially during the approval process.
The 2012 proposal would have required testing on each well, 40
while the 2013 proposal would allow operators to avoid testing well
integrity where other wells with the same specifications and geo-
logic parameters have been tested and have produced satisfactory
results. 4 1 According to BLM, this change was made because of its
agreement with industry comments that testing on every well may
be unnecessarily expensive, may induce unnecessary delay, and
would not decrease the risk of contamination of water aquifers. 42
Additionally, the 2012 proposal would have required submis-
sions of test results to BLM during the approval process-before
beginning fracking operations.43 In response to comments assert-
ing that BLM's review of casing and cementing test results during
the approval process would cause significant delay, the rule was
revised to take submission of test results out of the approval pro-
cess and instead require operators to submit the results after
fracking operations are completed. 44 The 2013 proposal does, how-
ever, add a requirement for operators to monitor and record the
flow rate, density, and pumping pressure of the cementing and run
40. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal and
Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691, 27,710 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3(c)(2)).
41. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,676 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3(e)(3)).
42. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,652 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160).
43. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal and
Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691, 27,710 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3(c)(2)).
44. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,658, 31,675 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-
3(e)(2)).
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a cementing and casing test prior to operations in the event that
monitoring indicates inadequate cementing. 45
The 2013 proposal also adds more flexibility for operators in
choosing which method to use in testing the well cementing and
casing. The 2012 proposal would have required operators to create
CBLs.46 Those logs comprise data generally gathered through a
sonic technology that detects whether casing is bound to the ce-
ment based on the level of resonance of vibrations. 47 The 2013 pro-
posal uses the broader term CEL rather than CBL. 4 8 CELs include
a variety of additional methods for testing well cementing and cas-
ing. 49 BLM may also allow another test required by a state or tribe
so long as it is "at least as effective in assuring adequate cement-
ing."50 Whether these changes will affect BLM's ability to ensure
proper casing and cementing is unclear.
IV. THE BLM PROPOSAL AND
STATE REGULATION
All western states with large shale gas reserves and significant
federal landholdings regulate oil and gas development and have
done so for decades. Within these regulations, many states have
rules that apply specifically to unconventional development. State
law generally does not apply on Indian lands, but many Indian
lands also have their own laws regulating oil and gas development.
Therefore, if BLM rules are different than state or tribal regula-
tions, operators would appear to be left with two layers of regula-
tion. In one sense, this is no different than on private lands, where
operators must comply with state law as well as any restrictions
imposed by the landowner via the lease or other agreement. Nev-
ertheless, BLM rules may require operators on federal lands in
many cases to interact with multiple layers of government (federal
and state), and therefore function in many ways as concurrent
regulations.
45. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,675 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3162.3-3(e)(1)).
46. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal and
Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R.
3162.2-2(c)(2)).
47. Oilfield Glossary, SCHLUMBERGER, http://glossary.oilfield.slb.com/en/Terms.aspx?
Lookln=term%20name&filter=cement%20bond%201og (last visited June 30, 2014).
48. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Land, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,651 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(e)(2)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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A. Preemption
Do BLM rules preempt (i.e., displace) state law? Generally, no.
The Supreme Court has recognized two ways that federal law can
preempt state law. "Conflict preemption" occurs where a federal
and state law directly conflict so that compliance with both is not
possible.51 Even where federal and state laws do not directly con-
flict, state law may be "field preempted" where federal regulation
in a certain area is so pervasive that it is clear, either by express
language or by implication, that lawmakers intended for the feder-
al government to occupy that entire field of regulation. 52
BLM makes clear in the 2013 proposal that it does not intend
to be the sole regulator of shale gas development on public lands
(and thus will not field preempt) but rather intends to create a
backstop regulation that will not preempt more stringent state
laws.5 3 States are therefore free to impose additional requirements
beyond those in BLM's rules, and existing state law that is more
stringent is not affected by BLM rules.
Furthermore, the 2013 proposed rule adds a provision allowing
states or tribes to apply for variances from the BLM rule for opera-
tional activities and technology standards, such as monitoring and
testing. 54 If BLM approves a variance on the grounds that it meets
or exceeds the agency's standards, compliance with the specific
state or tribal rule would satisfy the BLM rule.
BLM does not, however, address in the proposal the fact that
there could be areas where the state rule is different from the BLM
rule but not necessarily more or less stringent (and a variance is
not applied for or granted). In those cases, where the two rules di-
rectly conflict so that an operator could not simultaneously comply
with both, the BLM rule presumably would preempt the state rule.
In this respect, BLM rules are different from those imposed by pri-
vate landowners who obviously have no authority to alter state law
requirements. Whether such conflicts actually might occur in prac-
51. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
52. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
53. BLM concluded that the rule would not require a Federalism Assessment under
Executive Order 13132 because it "would not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government." 78 Fed. Reg. 31,669.
A Federalism Assessment includes identifying the additional costs and burdens on
the states, such as the likely sources of funding and the ability of the states to fulfill the
purposes of the policy and identifying the extent to which the policy affects the states'
ability to discharge their traditional functions. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685
(Oct. 26, 1987).
54. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,660-61 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(k)).
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tice is unclear, however. In our analysis of a selection of regulatory
elements below, we have not identified any.
Preemption on Indian lands is a bit different, as the Constitu-
tion grants Congress full authority to control tribal affairs and lim-
it their powers. Nonetheless, because of the long-existing policy of
recognizing tribal autonomy, federal regulation of oil and gas de-
velopment on Indian lands has been seen by some as overstepping
boundaries of tribal sovereignty.55 In fact, some argue that BLM
lacks statutory authority to regulate oil and gas on Indian lands at
all because Congress excluded Indian lands in its definition of pub-
lic lands under BLM jurisdiction.56
However, there is an apparent need for regulation of oil and
gas development on Indian lands. Unlike state regulations, tribal
laws governing oil and gas production are generally vague or non-
existent. For example, the legal code for the Blackfeet Indian Res-
ervation in Montana requires approval by a board for "extraction"
and "oil wells" but has no codified regulations for oil and gas drill-
ing in general or for fracking in particular.57
The position of the tribes appears to be mixed. Some Native
American advocates pushed for an opt-out provision for tribes with
their own regulations, which BLM refused to include in either ver-
sion of the proposed rule.5 8 Other tribes appear to support federal
regulation. For example, Wind River Indian Reservation in Wyo-
ming includes in its legal code a provision emphasizing the im-
portance of compliance with various federal environmental acts
and especially BLM's rules for onshore oil and gas development.59
Given the overlap between state (and tribal) regulations and
BLM rules and the ability of states to regulate more stringently,
the substantive significance of BLM's proposal in practice depends
on the degree to which it imposes requirements beyond those un-
der existing law. BLM rules will provide additional environmental
protection only if they are more stringent than those imposed by
states or restrict operator behavior in areas not addressed by state
rules at all.
55. See Tom Fredericks & Andrea Aseff, When Did Congress Deem Indian Lands Pub-
lic Lands?: The Problem of BLM Exercising Oil and Gas Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian
Country, 33 ENERGY L.J. 119 (2012), available at http://felj.org/sites/default/files/docs/elj331/
14-119-fredericksandaseff-problem-of blms indian country oil-and-gas jurisdiction.pdf.
56. Id.
57. BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAw & ORDER CODE, Ch. 12, § 3.03, available at http://narf.org/
nill/Codes/blackfeetcodefblkftcode l21and.htm.
58. See Mike Soraghan & Ellen M. Gilmer, Revised Interior Rule Loops in Industry-
Favored FracFocus, ENERGYWIRE (Feb. 8, 2013), available at http://eenews.net/stories/
1059976058.
59. SHOSHONE & ARAPAHO LAW & ORDER CODE tit. X, available at http://narf.org/nill/
Codes/shoshonearapaho/title-xi.pdf.
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It is important to note, however, that it is possible for BLM
rules to impose additional procedural burdens even if they do not
impose additional substantive requirements beyond those under
existing state law. For example, BLM could require operators to
undergo a separate permit process with identical (or weaker)
standards than states or to submit documents in different formats
than states require. Such procedural burdens should not be ig-
nored-they impose costs on operators without any direct envi-
ronmental or public health benefit.
B. Areas of Concurrent State
Regulation and BLM Rules
In order to ascertain the extent to which BLM's 2013 proposal
would require operators to take measures beyond those in current
state laws, we look at regulations in six states with large percent-
ages of federally owned mineral rights and potential shale gas de-
velopment-California, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Utah,
and Wyoming-and compare these regulations with the BLM
rules. Most of the state-level data are drawn from our 2013 report,
The State of State Shale Gas Regulation.60 That report detailed
regulations in thirty-one states across twenty-five regulatory ele-
ments that span the shale gas development process. In comparing
state rules with BLM's proposal, we look at eleven regulatory ele-
ments,61 excluding those that are generally regulated by another
federal agency or are relevant only at the state level. 6 2 For a few
elements covered by BLM's rules, we provide additional detail on
state regulations beyond that included in the report. The elements
reviewed in this section include the following:
* building setback restrictions;
* water setback restrictions;
* casing and cementing restrictions;
* testing of casing and cementing, including mechanical
integrity tests (MITs) and cement evaluation or bond
logs (CELs or CBLS);
* wastewater storage options (pits or tanks);
* pit liner requirements;
60. See Richardson et al., supra note 6.
61. In The State of State Shale Gas Regulation, readers will find four casing and ce-
menting regulatory elements. In the discussions in this paper, these are aggregated into one
category for convenience purposes. See Richardson et al., supra note 6.
62. For example, air quality regulation generally falls under EPA authority; BLM
therefore did not regulate venting and flaring of gas in its proposal. Severance tax rates and
the number of state-level regulatory agencies are also irrelevant to BLM's proposal.
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* wastewater transportation tracking;
* accident reporting;
* well idle time limits;
* temporary abandonment time limits; and
* frack fluid disclosure rules.
Even within these elements, there are limits on our ability to make
meaningful comparisons between state and BLM rules. BLM may
lack legal authority to regulate some elements fully. The agency
might also regulate informally via its case-by-case approval pro-
cess. More generally, we do not have data on enforcement or effec-
tiveness of BLM or state regulations. This limits our ability to
make any claims about relative or absolute quality of regulations
in practice.
The following subsections discuss each regulatory element in
both state regulations and BLM's rules, including the 2013 pro-
posal. The next section presents a general and statistical compari-
son.
1. Setback Restrictions
BLM's 2013 and 2012 proposals do not impose setback re-
strictions, required minimum distances between wells, and other
features believed to merit protection, such as buildings or water
sources. Though setback restrictions from buildings and water are
common in state regulations across the country, of the six western
states we examine here, only half have such regulations. 63
While there is no evidence to suggest that setback restrictions
are outside BLM jurisdiction, the agency may have other reasons
for leaving out setback restrictions. BLM land generally has far
lower building density than non-BLM land, 64 So setback rules
might be less necessary. Where setback restrictions are beneficial,
BLM might add them to its otherwise standard terms for oil and
gas leases. 65 For example, Wayne National Forest in Ohio requires
analyses by the Forest Service to determine whether setback re-
strictions should be added to specific fracking leases for the pur-
pose of protecting objects of historic or scientific interest, or sensi-
63. See Richardson et al., supra note 6, at 25.
64. For example, in 2012, there were only 149 buildings on Wyoming BLM-managed
federal lands, 678 buildings on California BLM lands, 215 buildings on New Mexico BLM
lands, and 18 buildings on BLM lands in all of the eastern states combined. See U.S. DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 250 (2012), available at
http://blm.gov/publicland statistics/plsl2/ps2012.pdf.
65. A standardized BLM oil and gas lease form can be found online at Offer To Lease
And Lease Oil And Gas, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., available at
http://blm.gov/pgdataletc/medialiblblmlnoc/business/eforms.Par.71287.File.dat/3100-011.pdf.
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tive habitat and wildlife.66 Deciding whether and to what extent to
include setbacks based on conditions at the lease site is akin to
case-by-case permitting.
2. Casing and Cementing
The 2013 proposal defaults to Onshore Order No. 267 for casing
and cementing rules. 68 According to Onshore Order No. 2, casing
and cementing programs "shall be conducted as approved to pro-
tect andlor isolate all usable water zones, lost circulation zones,
abnormally pressured zones, and any prospectively valuable depos-
its of minerals."69 In addition, casing depth is to be determined
based on "all relevant factors," including the presence or absence of
hydrocarbons, fracture gradients, usable water zones, formation
pressures, lost circulation zones, and other minerals.7 0 No specific
requirements are given. We classify this type of regulation as a
performance standard.
In contrast, all six western states regulate casing and cement-
ing depth with command-and-control regulations.71 Regulations in
four of the states impose requirements on cement composition. 72
All six states also regulate cement circulation: all require surface
casing to be cemented fully to the surface, and four of the six im-
pose requirements on circulation in intermediate and production
casing as well. 7 3
While the casing and cementing rules in Onshore Order No. 2
provide a large amount of flexibility, they are inherently less
transparent because of the lack of specific standards. BLM's per-
formance standards are therefore not necessarily less stringent
than state command-and-control rules (and could in practice be
more stringent), but it is difficult to ascertain exactly what is ex-
pected of operators on federal and Indian lands. As a result, it is
unclear to us (and perhaps also to operators) whether compliance
with a particular state (or tribal) rule is adequate to meet those
standards.
66. FOREST SERVICE, USDA, WAYNE NATIONAL FOREST LAND AND RESOURCE MAN-
AGEMENT PLAN app. H, available at http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSEDOCUMENTS/
stelprdb5387924.pdf.
67. Onshore Order No. 2, Drilling Operations, 43 C.F.R. § 3160 (1988).
68. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,661 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3160).
69. Onshore Order No. 2, Drilling Operations, 43 C.F.R. § 3160 (1988).
70. Id.
71. Richardson et al., supra note 6, at 33.
72. Id. at 34.
73. Id. at 35-38.
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Onshore Order No. 2 was issued in 1988, well before the shale
gas development boom. However, new information can alter what
BLM determines is adequate to satisfy the performance standards
it imposes. This illustrates the flexibility of a performance stand-
ard approach.
3. Casing and Cementing Testing
BLM requires mechanical integrity tests (MITs) before fracking
operations begin and every five years thereafter. 7 4 All six of the
western states require MITs, and four of them require testing at
five-year intervals.75
Colorado, Montana, and Wyoming require logging to ensure
that casing is properly bound to cement, and New Mexico requires
such logging in certain counties.76 Colorado and New Mexico, in
the counties where logging is required, specifically require CBLs.77
Similar to BLM's more general CEL requirement, Wyoming and
Montana require CBLs or other "acceptable" or "equivalent" meth-
ods.78 California and Utah do not require logging.7 9
Wyoming requires logging results as part of its approval-to-
drill process, and Colorado requires logging results thirty days af-
ter the setting of production casing in the form of an "interval re-
port" to ensure compliance with approved drilling plans.80 In con-
trast, BLM would not require CEL results until thirty days after
fracking is completed, unless monitoring indicates a problem with
the casing.81
74. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg. §
31,636, 31,647 31,653 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. 3162.3-3(c)(3)(i),
3162.3-3(0).
75. N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.26.11 (LexisNexis 2008); COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:326(a)
(2013); MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1416 (2011); 4 WYO. CODE R. § 7(d) (LexisNexis 2008); UTAH
ADMIN. CODE R. 649-5-5 (2013); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14 § 1724.10(j) (2011).
76. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317(o) (2013); MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1416(3) (2011); 4
WYo. CODE R. § 7(f)(iii) (LexisNexis 2010); N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.39.9, 19.15.39.10 (Lex-
isNexis 2008).
77. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317(o) (2013); N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.39.9, § 19.15.39.10
(LexisNexis 2008).
78. 4 WYO. CODE R. § 7(f)(iii) (LexisNexis 2010); MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.14.18(3)
(2011).
79. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14 § 1722 (2011); UTAH ADMIN. CODER. 649 (2013).
80. 4 WYO. CODE R. § 7(0(iii) (LexisNexis 2010); COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317(o)
(2013); COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:308B (2013).
81. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg. §
31,636, 31,651-52 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(e)(1), (4)).
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4. Frack Fluid Disclosure
As noted above, BLM would require operators to use FracFocus
(or an equivalent method) to fulfill the requirement to report frack
fluids after completing operations.82 Colorado, New Mexico, and
Montana also require disclosure after operations take place, 83
whereas Wyoming requires disclosure beforehand, as part of the
approval process. 84 Colorado and Montana require submission to
FracFocus. 85 California and Utah currently lack disclosure rules. 86
Given that operators on federal lands will also be subject to state
rules, a BLM rule requiring disclosure only after fracking is com-
pleted would not affect operators in the four states that require
pre-fracking disclosure but would be important in states without
any disclosure rules.
All four states with disclosure rules (Colorado, Montana, New
Mexico, and Wyoming) and BLM ask for disclosure of chemical
names and Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) numbers,87 additive
types and the concentration or maximum concentration of each
chemical used in the additives, the total concentration or maxi-
mum total concentration of each chemical in frack fluids, and the
total volume of water or frack fluid used.88 Trade secret exemp-
tions are permitted by all four states and BLM. 89 However, Colo-
rado and Montana mandate that trade secret information be re-
leased to healthcare professionals if they sign a confidentiality
agreement, or in the case of emergency situations, without the con-
fidentiality agreement. 90 BLM, New Mexico, and Wyoming do not
have such rules.
82. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg. §
31,636, 31,656 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. 3162.3-3(i)).
83. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A(b)(2) (2012); N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.16.19(b) (Lex-
isNexis 2008); MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1015 (2011).
84. 3 WYo. CODE R. § 45(d) (LexisNexis 2010).
85. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A(b)(2) (2012); MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1015 (2011).
86. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14 (2011); UTAH ADMIN. CODER. 649 (2013).
87. CAS numbers are unique numerical identifications assigned by the Chemical Ab-
stracts Service to all chemicals described in open scientific literature.
88. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg. §
31,636, 31,656 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. 3162.3-3(i)); COLO. CODE
REGS. § 404-1:205A(b)(2) (2012); MONT. ADMIN. R. § 36.22.1015; N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.16.19
(LexisNexis 2008); 3 WYO. CODE R. § 45(d) (LexisNexis 2010).
89. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg. §
31,636, 31,659 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. 3162.3-3(j)); 3 WYo.
CODE R. § 45(f) (LexisNexis 2010); N.M. CODE R. § 36.22.1016 (LexisNexis 2008); COLO.
CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A(b) (2012); MONT. ADMIN. R. § 36.22.1016 (2011).




BLM declined to revise the rule91 to follow several states (in
addition to Colorado and Montana) that require limited disclosure
of trade secrets under certain circumstances. 9 2 BLM claims that
the Federal Trade Secrets Act makes it a crime to release trade
secret information even under such circumstances. 9 3 However,
comments submitted in response to BLM's 2012 proposal gave de-
tailed legal explanations of why the act does not prevent disclosure
of trade secrets to health professionals, or perhaps at all. 94 Fur-
thermore, courts have emphasized that the act was not meant to
prevent agencies from promulgating rules requiring disclosure, but
to "forestall casual or thoughtless divulgence-disclosure made
without first going through a deliberative process with an oppor-
tunity for input from concerned parties."95 BLM authority to re-
quire disclosure of trade secrets therefore remains ambiguous.
5. Wastewater/Fluid Storage
As explained above, BLM's 2013 and 2012 proposals do not
require tanks for storage of any fluids, but they do require the
use of (at a minimum) single-lined pits for flowback and other
wastewater storage; BLM reserves the discretion to require addi-
tional measures to protect against leakage. 96 BLM rules would not
restrict types of fluids that can be stored in pits. Four of the west-
ern states also allow lined pit storage for all fluids.97 However,
New Mexico requires an application to use a pit, which must in-
clude operating and maintenance procedures, a closure plan, and a
hydrogeological report.98 Montana also restricts the type of fluids
that can be stored in pits, and many other states restrict the cir-
91. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3160) at 98-99.
92. At least six states (Colorado, Montana, Arkansas, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas)
have rules requiring operators to release trade secret information to health professionals. In
four of the states (Colorado, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Texas), confidentiality agreements
must be signed unless there is an emergency situation, and in the remaining two states
(Ohio and Arkansas), confidentiality agreements are not required. See MATTHEW MCFEE-
LEY, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, STATE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING DISCLOSURE RULES AND
ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARISON (2012), available at http://nrdc.org/energy/files/Fracking-
Disclosure-IB.pdf.
93. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,660 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3160).
94. See, e.g., NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE ON OIL AND
GAS; WELL STIMULATION, INCLUDING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, ON FEDERAL AND STATE
LANDS (2012), available at http://sierraclub.org/pressroom/downloads/BLM-comments-9-10-
12.pdf
95. CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
96. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 31,655-56 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(h)).
97. See Richardson et al., supra note 6, at 50-51.
98. N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.17.9(B)(4) (2013).
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cumstances under which pits can be used or the types of fluids
they can store.99
Comments in response to the 2012 proposal requested BLM to
require double-lined pits or tanks for some or all fluids.100 In the
2013 proposal, BLM claims that single-lined pits and tanks "rea-
sonably protect land and water" and are in keeping with the Amer-
ican Petroleum Institute's recommended practices for handling
completion fluids.101 BLM did, however, request an evaluation on
the costs of requiring flowback fluids to be stored in tanks. 102 Other
commenters argued that the fluid storage regulation was repeti-
tious with state rules (a claim generally made regarding the BLM
proposal). 103 But according to BLM, its pit liner requirement would
''compel only six additional lined pits per year," because most of
the states where BLM manages oil and gas resources already re-
quire pit liners.104
6. Wastewater Transportation Tracking
In choosing not to revise the 2012 proposal to include more in-
formation on wastewater transportation plans as requested by
some commenters, BLM pointed to Onshore Order No. 7,105 which
requires an operator to submit a copy of the disposal facility's per-
mit and, where wastewater will travel over federal or Indian lands
off the lease site, a BLM right-of-way authorization.106 The pro-
posal leaves out comprehensive record-keeping of wastewater
transportation, which many states require.107
Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico have record-keeping require-
ments, and New Mexico also requires a permit for wastewater
transportation. 08 While some aspects that are typically included in
record-keeping, such as the location of the disposal facility, are re-
quired by Onshore Order No. 7, many other aspects are left out,
99. See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 732/1-75 (West 2013) (allowing pits for tempo-
rary storage only in the event that flowback is more than anticipated; see also MICH. ADMIN.
CODE R. 324.407 (2006) (limiting the type of wastewater that can be stored in pits and re-
quires tanks if drilling is located in a residential zone).
100. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.




104. Id. at 31,666
105. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,636, 51,655-56 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3160).
106. Onshore Order No. 7, Disposal of Produced Water, Section III.B., 43 C.F.R. § 3160
(1993).
107. See Richardson et al., supra note 6, at 57-58.




including dates of pickup and delivery, the type of fluid being
transported, and a requirement to hold on to transportation rec-
ords for a specified period of time.109
However, BLM may have had a good reason for leaving out
such record-keeping. Wastewater transportation by means of vehi-
cles using interstate highways is regulated by the Department of
Transportation (DOT)11 0 and is outside the jurisdiction of BLM 111-
while drilling occurs on federal lands, transportation may not.
While BLM could have created more stringent regulations for
tracking wastewater transportation on public lands, jurisdiction
would shift to the DOT whenever interstate highways were used.
Wastewater transported on state or private roads would fall within
the jurisdiction of the state and would also be outside of BLM's ju-
risdiction.
7. Accident Reporting
Existing BLM rules require operators to notify BLM when "un-
desirable events occur," which may include accidental spills or re-
leases of hydrocarbon fluids, produced water, hydraulic fracturing
flowback fluids, or other substances. 112 Notification is required
within twenty-four hours for accidents considered major. 113 The
majority of all states with shale gas development have specific
maximum time limits for accident reporting, with California being
the only state of the six analyzed here that does not have such re-
quirements. Montana requires reporting immediately, and the re-
maining four require reporting within twenty-four hours.114
109. Onshore Order and Gas Order No. 7, Disposal of Produced Water, 43 C.F.R. §
3160 (1993).
110. 49 C.F.R. Subt. B, Ch. 1 (2011).
111. "Equipment and vehicles using interstates and highways must be licensed and fol-
low Department of Transportation procedures for transporting wastewater. These proce-
dures are outside of BLM's jurisdiction." U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND
MGMT., REFERENCE No. 3100/(UT-922000), PROTEST TO THE INCLUSION OF CERTAIN PAR-




112. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CONSERVATION DIV., NTL-3A,
NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF ONSHORE FEDERAL AND INDIAN OIL AND GAS LEAS-
ES, REPORTING OF UNDESIRABLE EVENTS, available at http://blm.gov/pgdataletc/medialib/
blm/wolMINERALS REALTYAND RESOURCEPROTECTION /energy/oil-and-gas.Pa
r.86049.File.dat/NTL3A.pdf.
113. Id.
114. See Richardson et al., supra note 6, at 71-72
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8. Well Idle and Temporary Abandonment
Most states, including all six western states analyzed, put spe-
cific time restrictions on how long a well can be left idle until it
must be put back into operation, converted to a waste disposal
well, plugged and abandoned, or in many states, temporarily
abandoned.115 These regulations prevent operators from allowing
wells to fall into disrepair. BLM did not address idle time or tem-
porary abandonment in its 2013 or 2012 proposals, nor are these
addressed in Onshore Order No. 2. Well idle time and time limits
vary widely across states. Four of the western states (Colorado,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) allow temporary abandonment,
during which an operator may continue to leave a well idle but
must generally take certain measures to reduce the risk of damage
or contamination. 116
C. Overall Comparisons
The simplest comparison of existing state and proposed BLM
rules is a tally of the regulatory elements we analyze for the states
and BLM. This gives some sense of the breadth of BLM's regulato-
ry posture compared with state regulations. Figure 1 shows the
total number of elements regulated by California, Colorado, Mon-
tana, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, and BLM. Of the elements in
our analysis, Colorado and New Mexico regulate all eleven in some
fashion. Under its 2013 proposal and existing rules, BLM would
regulate seven elements. Only California among the six states ana-
lyzed would regulate fewer.
Table 1 shows each element and how it is regulated by each
state, existing BLM regulations, and the 2013 proposal, including
the regulatory tool used. This shows two notable differences be-
tween BLM rules and the state rules, which were also explained in
more detail above. First, BLM neither has nor proposes to add re-
quirements for idle time or temporary abandonment, which are
regulated in some way by all six states. Second, all six states have
command-and-control regulations addressing various aspects of
casing and cementing, whereas BLM has performance standards.
The table also shows that existing BLM rules do not appear to
impose significant substantive requirements on operators in these
states, at least for the elements in our analysis-though, as noted,
determining the effective stringency of BLM casing and cementing
115. Id. at 67-71.
116. See id. at 70-71.
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performance standards is difficult. State command-and-control
rules for casing and cementing could be stringent enough to satisfy
BLM performance standards for casing and cementing. Since, like
BLM, four of the states require accident reporting within twenty-
four hours and a fifth requires reporting immediately, BLM regu-
lation impacts operators in only one of the six states we consid-
ered-California, where accident reporting is not required.
BLM's 2013 proposed rule is more stringent than the rules in
certain states in only three areas, also shown in Table 1. First,
BLM rules would ensure that pit liners are to be used on federal
and Indian lands in the three states that do not already require
them generally. Second, the BLM rule would add frack fluid disclo-
sure requirements on federal and Indian lands in both California
and Utah. Finally, a BLM rule would require operators to record
integrity tests in CELs on federal and Indian lands in California,
Utah, and Montana, and it would require more frequent tests
(MITs) in California and Utah.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The federal government controls access to oil and gas resources
on thirty-six million acres of federal and Indian lands (and private
lands for which the federal government retains subsurface rights)
across twenty-four states. This makes BLM, as administrator and
steward of these lands, the largest single player in unconventional
development and, in effect, the largest regulator. With its 2012
and 2013 proposals, BLM set out to update rules not revised in
decades to better address risks imposed by the rapid expansion in
unconventional development driven by hydraulic fracturing and
horizontal drilling technologies.
Whether BLM achieved that goal remains a subject of debate.
The 2013 proposed rule contains significant changes that generally
make the rule less restrictive than the 2012 proposal. In some cas-
es, lack of BLM authority means that the breadth of the rule ap-
pears limited in comparison with state rules. For a crucial part of
the development process-casing and cementing-BLM's rules are
not updated at all, though existing rules are framed as perfor-
mance standards that appear sufficiently flexible to address any
additional risks imposed by unconventional development.
Comparing BLM's proposal with existing state rules reveals
that in a few states and regulatory areas, operators would face ad-
ditional requirements on federal lands. For example, BLM rules
would require use of lined pits and disclosure of frack fluids in
those states that do not impose similar requirements. Generally,
however, BLM rules do not appear to impose significant require-
ments beyond existing state regulations, at least across the regula-
tory elements we analyzed and in those states with large federal
landholdings. Moreover, in some regulatory areas (notably setback
requirements), states generally have requirements whereas BLM
does not.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that, like the states,
BLM may place additional requirements on operators during the
permitting process as a condition of approval. And like a landown-
er, it might also add lease terms that go beyond the requirements
in the regulations. Moreover, BLM might enforce its regulations
more (or less) consistently or effectively than states do.
Critics of BLM's proposal have claimed that it either is inade-
quate to protect the public and the environment on federal lands or
is unnecessary and burdensome. Given the background of state
regulation, a better measure may be whether each component of
the proposal provides meaningful additional protections. Based on
our analysis, BLM's proposal does fill some apparent gaps in state
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regulation but does not significantly deviate from the prevailing
set of requirements under state law.
Indeed, industry critics allege that BLM's proposal unneces-
sarily duplicates state rules. Unless BLM imposes costly new pro-
cedural requirements, there is little downside to such federal rules
that duplicate state rules for the most part and impose additional
requirements only in states that leave certain practices unregulat-
ed. BLM's resources therefore are probably best focused on those
areas either where some states have failed to regulate a risk that
BLM considers significant or where the consequences of develop-
ment are greater on public lands. Advocates of stronger regulation
thus would be better off advocating for such things as greater re-
quirements for flowback/wastewater containment so as to better
protect pristine surface waters, rather than criticizing BLM's deci-
sion not to include setback restrictions from buildings, which state
law may already address adequately. Generally, BLM appears to
be following this model.
Alternatively, however, some argue that federal rules should
not merely fill gaps in state regulations or address special risks,
but rather serve as a model for strong, effective regulations. If one
holds this view, than a comprehensive, internally consistent set of
regulations is important. Limitations on BLM's jurisdiction, re-
sources, and expertise make this task difficult, however.
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